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ABSTRACT
Guatemala has been torn by class, race, gender, and politics throughout its history. During the
late nineteenth-century coffee boom, elites expanded their landholdings at the expense of peasant
communities. The new landowners exerted their power over the Indigenous and poor ladino
(non-Indigenous) population, forcing them to labor in the plantations with little to no
compensation. In 1954, the United States aided in a coup that overthrew president Jacobo Arbenz
Guzmán, whose social reforms provided hope to the subjugated. The continued exploitation and
discrimination that the natives and poor ladinos bore ultimately led to the Guatemalan Civil war
of 1960. The civil war was a 36-year battle between left-wing guerrillas and the Guatemalan
government, however, government officials increasingly targeted non-combatant, civilian
populations. In the military's attempt to end the rebellions they implemented a systematic use of
terror, annihilating over 200,000 people, of which 80 percent were Indigenous, while capturing
over 45,000 people who were then forcibly “disappeared.” Women also became targeted victims
of mass rape and sexual violence. These realities lead to some essential questions. In what ways
was gender essential to counterinsurgency tactics? How did the impact of this war affect
Indigenous women and men differently? What impact did this war have on Indigenous women
and cultures? Were women able to resist and rise above the oppressive state?
Race and class intersected with gender, and all three were essential component in Guatemala’s
Civil war as women, the poor, and Indigenous people bore the brunt of the violence. Yet,
Indigenous women and men overcame the brutalities they encountered by galvanizing Mayans in
order to unite and resist the state’s inflicted oppression. Through aggressive guerrilla insurgency
women’s empowerment and actions, and pressures from pan-Mayan mobilization the
Guatemalan government was forced to cease battle.

Introduction
“We have been beaten and humiliated, but the race was never defeated.”1
Words inscribed on the tomb of Thelma Beatriz Argueta, a K’iche beauty queen

The history of Guatemala’s rural Indigenous communities unearths a traumatic and
sinister story of government-enforced coercion, racism, gender-based violence, and genocide
juxtaposed with Mayans’ resistance, resilience, and uncompromising stance against
dehumanization. It was a clash between the Guatemalan government and leftist guerrilla groups
that ignited a 36-year Civil War. A battle in which the state’s military targeted non-combatant,

Argueta, a K’iche beauty queen died at the start of her reign in 1970. See Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala:
A History of Race and Nation (London: Duke, 2000), p4.
1
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civilian populations, slaughtering over 200,000 people, of which 83 percent were Indigenous,
and over 45,000 were kidnapped and then forcibly “disappeared.” The organization of
oppositional guerrilla groups, that were largely comprised of Mayans and the ladino poor, was
the consequence of long-standing tensions that dated back to the 1870s. According to historian
Greg Grandin, when the nation’s expansion in coffee cultivation produced a new liberal agroexport state it also created “Guatemala’s agrarian proletariat that took place along clearly defined
ethnic lines.”2 The wealthy elite minority benefited from the expropriation of Indigenous land
and labor exploitation. A budding export economy deepened the ethnic and class divide, as
coffee production depended more on the subjugation of all campesinos Indígenas.3 The
dominating elite wielded their power over Indigenous communities, leaving them with few
resources to sustain their families. Often, the military aggressively suppressed petitions for
reform or peaceful protests, as the government saw these acts as challenging state authority. In
the early 1980s the escalation of violence had reached its peak in state-orchestrated attacks
against Mayans and their highland communities for suspicions of supporting guerrilla forces.
During this heightened period of violence Indigenous men and women suffered the most
egregious acts of cruelty as military forces wiped out entire Mayan villages, calling the early part
of this decade the bloodiest period of the civil war.
As Mayan mobilization intensified and anti-communist sentiment spread, the Guatemalan
government labeled Indigenous groups as subversive communists that needed to be eliminated.
However, not all Mayans were subversive or communist, yet their ethnic identity alone
determined their guilt in the eyes of the state. The government implemented severe

2

Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race and Nation (London: Duke, 2000), p 15-16.
Campesinos Indígenas are Indigenous farmers, many illiterates, who express themselves in their mother tongue.
However, the term when used alone campesino refers to the rural poor.
3
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counterinsurgency tactics against the guerrillas; however, it was not enough to suppress the
uprisings. Kaibiles,4 a special operations unit of the Guatemala military forces, took on a new
strategy, state terror. Kaibiles performed calculated acts of violence on communities accused of
being insubordinate, and women, in particular, were targeted. Mass rape and femicide became a
part of common practice during military incursions. The government ordered a scorched-earth
policy, burning Indigenous villages across Guatemala because they perceived them to be the
support bases for guerrilla forces. The scorched-earth policy resulted in thousands of orphaned
children, massive displacement, and the destruction of homes and milpas (cornfields), which
most Mayans relied on for survival. 5
Over three decades of internal conflict came to a final halt when peace negotiations were
finalized, and the Peace Accords were signed in December of 1996. Part of the peace agreement
was to investigate and document the thousands of human rights violations and atrocities that
transpired during the 36-year war. This was accomplished through the United Nations-sponsored
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH), a team that would conclude the Guatemalan
Civil War a genocide and provide the recommendations for peace and reconciliation processes.
The calculated scorched-earth attacks on communities, the deliberate torture of women and
children, and the public execution of Mayans are a small fraction of the vicious acts carried out
on the Mayan population. The Civil War in Guatemala was a difficult yet important part of
history, because it provides us with the ability to understand a period of conflict and state
violence through race, gender, and class.

Kaibil is a Mayan term loosely translated as “warrior” or “strategist.” Kaibiles are a special forces unit from the
Jungle of Training school in El Petén. Jennifer G. Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project: A Violence Called
Democracy (Philadelphia: Univ of Penn Press, 1998), p 304.
5
Rachel Nolan, “Children for Export”: A History of International Adoption from Guatemala (New York
University: PhD diss., 2018) p 252.
4
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This thesis examines how Indigenous identity and gender intersected and transformed
throughout this period, how ethnic conflict resulted in the killing of a people, and how sexual
violence was used as a tool in this systematically imposed state terror during the civil war.
Premeditated murder of Indigenous peoples was not initially gender oriented; however, Mayan
women became targeted victims of mass rape, torture, and femicide. Children often received the
same fate as their mothers and later burned or buried in clandestine cemeteries. However,
women’s suffering did not preclude their agency. In fact, some Maya women drew strength from
their tragedies. The more they witnessed the incessant deterioration of their people, the more
vigor it gave them to rise against the state’s tyranny. Through testimonial accounts, hundreds of
Mayan women attested to empowering themselves through collective action, freeing themselves
from the patriarchal system that entangled them. No longer were they victims, they became
angry, and their anger transformed into mass mobilization. Firsthand accounts have shown that
their participation was never solely for the individual pursuit of triumph rather than for the
collective victory of all Mayans.

Sources
Primary Sources
In order to obtain the voices of Indigenous women, I turned to testimonies that have been
filtered through various interviewers, as most government-produced documents excluded the
Indigenous perspectives that my research required. For this reason, I centered my research
around testimonies provided by Mayans who witnessed or endured the brutalities imposed by the
state. I have also examined accounts from ex-guerrillas who related their experiences throughout
the war. Most of the testimonies I selected are drawn from Indigenous women who offer an
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exclusive lens into the lived-experiences of Mayans, a perspective often omitted from other types
of documents. These documents, like other firsthand accounts, are never without flaws. The
process in retelling what transpired can never be taken as entirely accurate, especially because
these testimonies have been put together through scholarly projects, government-funded
organizations, and religious institutions that filter already imperfect narratives to fit within their
agendas. Imperfection in recounting experiences can emerge, in some cases, owning to the lapse
of time, and, in other cases, the interviewee’s goal in conveying the sense of life and death
urgency of the period.
The most famous testimony I used was I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indigenous Woman in
Guatemala, collected and edited by anthropologist Elisabeth Burgos-Debray when Menchú was
only 23 years old and had fled Guatemala after most of her family was killed. Menchú’s
testimony brought international awareness to the brutalities that plagued Mayans during the
height of the civil war. Menchú related her testimony in Spanish to interviewer/editor BurgosDebray who then filtered and organized her words in a way that was fitting for the Western
audience that Burgos-Debray was aiming to attract with the book. Menchú told her life in a way
that highlighted the violence against Guatemalan Indigenous peoples, with particular detail given
to her own family members’ deaths. She also discussed Indigenous culture and resilience,
including Indigenous women’s strength. In the late 1990s, anthropologist David Stoll published a
monograph that criticized Menchú’s testimony, arguing that her rendering of specific “events
and circumstances could not withstand being subjected to the magnifying glass of social
inquiry,” and therefore making it “possible for the entire narrative to be dismissed as a mere
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fabrication or perhaps even lies, especially at the hand of the narrator’s advisories.” 6 In
particular, Stoll questioned Menchú’s description of her brother Petrocinio’s execution, claiming
that she was not present to bear witness when he was killed. Other scholars took issue with
Stoll’s analysis, such as Mary Louise Pratt, who believes that “however significant the
discrepancies between Menchú’s narrated testimony and the reconstructable facts of her life, it
remains incongruous to equate these ethically with the monstrosities of the army, [and] the
enormity of Indigenous suffering and loss.”7 Carol A. Smith addresses his rejection of racism as
a factor in influencing Guatemalan violence stating, “[r]acism accounts for the nature of the final
solution in the 1980s the huge massacres of Indigenous people.”8 Despite the imperfect
testimony Menchú gave of her family there has been a substantial amount of firsthand accounts
that reflect the same monstrosities Menchú illustrates.
Burgos-Debray’s publication of Menchú’s primary source was a useful tool when
combined with others, corroborating primary source testimony about how the state
systematically organized attacks on the Mayan population. One of these resulted from
Guatemala’s Truth Commission reports, the United Nation-sponsored Commission for Historical
Clarification (CEH). Following the Peace Accord agreement in1996 the CEH was officially
established and went on for two years after which its final report was printed in 1999, titled
Guatemala: Memory of Silence (Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio). I obtained the final report of
the CEH in English and Spanish from separate government websites. The Spanish CEH report
offers a complete report of 4,383 human rights violations and acts of violence connected with the

W. George Lovell and Christopher H. Lutz, “The Primacy of Larger Truths,” in Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta
Menchú Controversy (Minneapolis :University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p 172.
7
Mary Louise Pratt, “I, Rigoberta Menchú and the ‘Culture Wars,’” in Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta Menchú
Controversy (Minneapolis :University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p 45.
8
Carol A. Smith, “Why Write Expose of Rigoberta Menchú?” in Arturo Arias, ed., The Rigoberta Menchú
Controversy, p 145.
6
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armed conflict as opposed to the 82-page English volume, which was limited to the conclusion
and recommendations of their findings. I used these documents for firsthand accounts of
Indigenous civilians to find information on violence against women, detailed evidence of
insurgents and counterinsurgents, the state’s role and strategies, and statistical data to support the
impact Mayans as a whole encountered, but specifically regarding violence towards women. I
was also able to extract pieces of the CEH’s findings from two of my secondary sources, which
were organized by summarizing scenes and attaching testimonies. 9 The narrowing down of
topics within these sources, such as gender, torture and murders, state power and military
formation that were then linked with primary documents, allowed me to maneuver more readily
through information and grasp the context in which these CEH records support.
The Roman Catholic archdiocese’s project for the Recovery of Historical Memory
(REMHI) was developed for the purpose of “reconstructing the history of pain and death,
understanding the reasons for it, the why and the how.”10 This project was coordinated by
Guatemalan Archdiocesan Human Rights Office (ODHAG) under the leadership of Bishop Juan
Gerardi Conedera and printed in 1998. It is made up of 5,465 testimonies including 52,427
documented victims of human rights and humanitarian violation, for which the church wanted to
seek peace, justice and reconciliation. 11 The testimonies I used gave me the ability to convey the
horrific carnage that was encompassed by the civil war. I used the English abridged book

9

A significant amount of CEH documents were found in two of my secondary sources: Greg Grandin, Who is
Rigoberta Menchú? (New York: Verso, 2011), and Etelle Higonnet, Quiet Genocide: Guatemala 1981-1983
(London: Transaction,2009).
10
REMHI, Recovery of Historical Memory Project; The official report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of
Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, (London: Orbis Books, 1999), p xxii.
11
REMHI, Guatemala: Never Again!,
p 289.
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Guatemala: Never Again!, for information about violence against Indigenous women and
children, as well as Indigenous women’s resistance and empowerment. 12
Contrary to my other primary sources, Memorias Rebeldes Contra el Olvido is a book
composed of collected testimonies of ex-combatant women. It was published by a group of
women from the feminist publication La Cuerda; Plataforma Agraria, a political alliance
committed to building a social movement, and the research center La Asociación para el Avance
de las Ciencias Sociales (AVANCSO).13 All these women were part of the rebel guerrilla group
Army of the Poor (EGP) a group that by 1982 had merged along with three other guerrilla groups
to form a united front under Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). These women
asked compañeras from AVANCSO and Plataforma Agraria about putting a narrative together
concerning Indigenous women’s struggle and what the war represented for them. Some
interviewers faced a language barrier, as some interviews were given in Spanish and others in
their native tongue. I must point out again that these interviews were filtered two to three times
over after being funneled through interpreters, interviewers, and editors. Nonetheless, the

12

Further material was found on women, children, and the disintegration of Indigenous family in Rachel Nolan’s
“Children for Export”: A History of International Adoption from Guatemala, (New York University: PhD diss.,
2018). Nolan’s research aided me further in analyzing the state’s use of psychological violence on Indigenous
mothers as a form of torture in their ploy to remove children from families and place them up for adoption. Nolan
exposes the states racist angle for adopting Indigenous children out of Guatemala….
13
Rosalinda Hernández Alarcón, Memorias Rebeldes Contra el Olvido (Guatemala: Cuerda, 2008), p 12.
Detailed description of those groups who took part in compiling this book of testimonies of ex-combatants Maya
women was in the rear inner fold of this book. La Cuerda is a Guatemalan association of diverse women who adhere
to feminism, understood as a philosophical and political theory of analysis, a political practice in favor of social
transformation and a lifestyle and being that in general seek to eliminate discrimination and raise equality between
women and brothers, between ethnicities and diverse social groups. Plataforma Agraria is a political, diverse and
multisectoral alliance committed to building a social movement that fights for structural agrarian changes and rural
development, that is capable of linking specific demands with national agendas, as well as interweaving local
dynamics with international ones. maintains a critical stance against government agendas and promotes political
initiatives to achieve progress in favor of the excluded majority. AVANCSO is private non-profit institution, whose
mission is to contribute, through its research institute, to the understanding of the most significant problems of the
Guatemalan social process.
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testimonies I used supported my questions concerning gender-based violence, guerrilla life for
Indigenous women, intersecting roles of men and women, and women’s agency.
While these aforementioned sources have gone through a variety of filters, Victor
Montejo’s Testimony: Death of a Guatemalan Village is the one primary source that was
composed and published by the person testifying. Montejo was a ladino schoolteacher, and
though he sympathized with Mayan people, his perspective of the events that unfolded in the
remote village of Tzalala in northwest Huehuetenango was not the voice I most needed for my
research. It was, nonetheless, a useful instrument in providing me with detailed accounts of the
unjust military executions, unsubstantiated accusations of innocent villagers labeled “internal
enemy,” brutal public execution, and civil patrol (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil or PAC Spanish
acronym) compliance in the murdering and torturing of their Indigenous counterparts under the
orders of the military agents. Montejo’s experience of being taken by the military also gave
documentation about his experience in the barracks, the state control over him after his release,
and different treatment he received for being a ladino from the city.
Secondary Sources
The secondary sources I used cover a range of periods within Guatemalan history, which
allowed me to better understand the baseline of what drove this war into the direction of gender
violence, geared towards women and ultimately genocide. While much has been written about
the Indigenous history of Guatemala, I selected a few sources from the premier historian of
modern Guatemalan history, Greg Grandin. Grandin’s Blood of Guatemala: A History of Race
and Nation focuses on two centuries of Indigenous and ladino relations starting from the mid-
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eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, which concentrates on the Maya-K’iche’14 of
Quetzaltenango, a city in Guatemala’s western highlands. Grandin goes through critical points of
Guatemala’s past that aided me in analyzing the ethnic division, class struggle, as well as the
“social and political restructuring that heavily contested the authority of landed elite in 1944 and
the fall of president Jacobo Árbenz in 1954.”15 Though Grandin’s book was useful in his
discussion about gender roles with the K’iche’ community as wells as Indigenous women and
national identity, it lacked the in-depth analysis of Indigenous women’s lives that I needed.
Whereas Grandin lacked Indigenous women, David Carey Jr.’s, Engendering Mayan
History: Kaqchikel Women as Agents and Conduits of the Past, 1875-1970, captured the
“marginal histories and hidden forces” of Kaqchikel 16 women.17 Carey’s desire to bring attention
to the often omitted contributions of Maya women to national histories from their perspectives,
in their own voices was important to my work because it provided a more complete picture of
Indigenous life, specifically women’s contribution within Mayan communities. The 250 oral
histories collected by Carey and his Kaqchikel research assistants displayed women’s tendency
to defy gender codes, taking on male characteristics and roles spearheaded their mobility within
their communities and even into ladino life. This book gave me the history of how Indigenous
women contributed to the shaping Guatemala’s past.
In her book The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy, Jennifer
Schirmer states that an examination of the Guatemalan military “serves as a window onto the

Maya-K’iche’ people are one of the 22 different Mayan ethnic groups from the Western Highlands of Guatemala.
Indigenous groups in Guatemala are not only separated by different Indigenous languages and cultures.
15
Greg Grandin, The Blood of Guatemala, p7.
16
Kaqchikel people were Mayans from the midwestern highlands of Guatemala whose native language was the third
most common language in Guatemala.
17
David Carey Jr, Engendering Mayan History: Kaqchikel Women as Agents and Conduits of the Past, 1875-1970
(New York: Routledge, 2006), p2.
14
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internal workings and thinking of the most powerful, least researched, and least understood
institution in Guatemala.”18 Schirmer’s research provides the military’s perspective of the war,
based on the interviews that she conducted with individuals ranging from former heads of state,
defense ministers, military officers, congressional deputies, lawyers, and journalists from 1986 to
1996. Schirmer’s work gave me the detailed background into the Guatemalan military and its
intellectual evolution and strategic transition. This monograph was an important part in my
analysis of the state’s counterinsurgency tactics from first-hand accounts of the state’s most
powerful and influential forces starting from the October Revolution of 1944 through the late
1980s.
Betsy Konefal’s For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism In Guatemala,
1960- 1990, examined Mayan participation in the development of oppositional political activism
and offers a look into Maya mass mobilization as well as their role in civil war. She provides an
understanding Indigenous identity, the discriminatory social relations between the ladinos and
Mayans. Konefal’s discussion concerning the Catholic church’s role in spearheading pan-Mayan
mobilization was key to grasping how impactful the church along with their new teachings of
Liberation Theology19 was in rural Mayan communities and in the war throughout the 1960s70s.20 Konefal also discussed the Panzós massacre of 1978, which not only intensified resistance,
but raised issues of national identity, which she explored via Indigenous beauty queens.

18

Jennifer G. Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: Univ of
Penn Press, 1998), p 1.
19
Liberation Theology was a new Catholic religious movement, based on the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965)
and the Episcopal Conference of Medellín (1968), in which priests and nuns aligned themselves with the poor and
oppressed in pursuit of social justice through social action and rural community empowerment.
20
Betsy Konefal, For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala 1960-1990 (Albuquerque:
Univ of New Mexico Press, 2010), p 34.
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Both Cindy Forster’s articles “Violent and Violated Women: Justice and Gender in Rural
Guatemala, 1936-1956” and “Me di Cuenta de Que Sí Podemos: Mujeres Indígenas y
Campesinas en La Revolución Guatemalteca, 1970-2000” expose the violent nature of the state
towards Indigenous women while also illustrating how women resisted oppression, patriarchal
norms, and empowered themselves through the most traumatic condition. “Violent and Violated
Women” gave me an insight into violence that had already been around long before the civil war
began in 1960, and how inalienable rights were denied to women, who had no right to physical
privacy.21 The article “Me di Cuenta” provided evidence of Indigenous women’s empowerment.
Former women combatants shared their experiences and how they transformed pain into power.
They no longer adhered to the patriarchal idea of women’s submissive position, men and women
became one in the struggle against the ladino state.
Some works combined secondary and primary sources. Greg Grandin’s Who is Rigoberta
Menchú? was composed in defense Menchú’s testimony in contradiction of “the intellectual
apologist of the world’s most powerful nation,” and directly criticized American anthropologist
David Stoll, who saw her as merely “an Indian with an agenda.” 22 In addition, this book’s second
half focused on “Clarifying History” and “Judging Genocide” through a host of document
excerpts from Commission for Historical Clarification’s (CEH). In all, Grandin’s work
contributed in understanding and analyzing Stoll’s controversy while the CEH documents
provided more primary-source evidence with a different voice. The Guatemala Reader, contains
a wealth of information from scholars that allowed me to fill in any gaps from my other sources.
For example, McCreery’s essay “Land, Labor, and Community,” in combination with Cindy

21

Cindy Foster, "Violent and Violated Women: Justice and Gender in Rural Guatemala, 1936-195?," Journal of
Women's History 11, no. 3 (1999), p 75.
22
Greg Grandin, Who is Rigoberta Menchú? (New York: Verso, 2011), p 3
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Forster’s monograph allowed me to explain the history of coffee exports, Indigenous labor, and
land reform.
Synopsis of the Civil War, Terror, and Genocide
“Let the history we lived be taught in the schools, so that it is never forgotten, so our children
may know it.” – A CEH Witness 23
Historian Betsy Konefal indicates that 80 percent of those who were massacred and
disappeared in the armed conflict that began in 1960 were Mayan, and approximately 93 percent
of these victims were killed at the hands of the state. 24 A death toll not at all surprising to the
Guatemalan government who created the institutional structures [the military] that, according to
Jennifer Schirmer, “allowed them to undertake the dual objectives of repression and
consolidation, of warmaking and statecrafting, and of strengthening internal repressive
capacities…while self-consciously speaking about autonomy from the oligarchy and lack of
responsibility for human rights violations.”25 But what created such revulsion for a race that
constituted a majority of Guatemala's population? It must be understood that during the Spanish
conquest and subsequent colonization, Spanish colonizers fostered an environment of exclusion,
antagonism, and conflict towards Indigenous peoples. These conditions and sentiments carried
over into its independence. It was the ambition and greed of Guatemala's liberal oligarchs of the
mid to late nineteenth century that exacerbated the racist precepts that Spanish conquerors used
to rationalize the containment of Mayans.26 The liberal elite class focused less on political liberty
and more on economic progress.27 The progress manifested through coffee cultivation and

23

This quote was taken from a testimony given to the CEH (author unknown). CEH, p 10.
Betsy Konefal, For Every Indio Who Falls: A History of Maya Activism in Guatemala 1960-1990 (Albuquerque:
Univ of New Mexico Press, 2010), p 13.
25
Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project, p 2.
26
Grandin, Who is Rigoberta Menchú?, p 102.
27
Cindy Forster, The Time of Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala’s October Revolution (Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg Press, 2002), p14.
24
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export, which objectified an entire race. In essence, coffee was ultimately the catalyst that led to
one of the bloodiest civil wars in Latin America that ravaged a people. As Grandin points out
“[w]ithout an export crop, Guatemala’s pre-coffee economy did not integrate Indians, in however
exploitive a fashion, into colonial society.” 28 In part, Mayans were given the space to subsist as
Mayans. However, as coffee fincas began springing up and the demand for exports rose, Liberal
elites became increasingly frustrated with Carrera's conservative regime impeding on their
economic wealth. Cultivation required intense labor and land to create a “profitable enterprise.”29
Yet, Conservatives were geared toward protecting Mayans. In 1865, the Gaceta de Guatemala
informed the public that the government's job “was to protect Indians and to improve their
spiritual and material situation; they should be 'moralized' with 'kindness' and prudence.” 30 By
1871, as historian Cindy Forster explains, alliance between “consummate politician and
merchant Miguel Garcia Granados and San Marcos [planter] Justo Rufino Barrios, along with
Guatemala city’s merchant class, solidified Liberals support to take down the conservative
regime.31
Many historians have noted the important connection between the economics of coffee
and the politics of nineteenth-century liberalism. Following the Liberal takeover, Granados, a
gradual reformist, took office for a short term before the more rigid Liberal dictator Justo Rufino
Barrios seized power in 1873. Cindy Forster notes that under Barrios’ reign “coffee became
Guatemala’s chief export and the state’s main source of income.” 32 Likewise, David McCreery

28

Grandin, Who is Rigoberta Menchú?, p 127.
David McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community in Grandin, Greg, Deborah Levenson-Estrada, and Elizabeth
Oglesby, eds., The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, Politics (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2011), p
118.
30
David McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p 118.
31
Forster, The Time of Freedom, p 14.
32
Forster, The Time of Freedom, p 15.
29
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noted that the coffee boom led to a series of laws that were directed “at breaking the autonomy of
Indigenous communities.”33 Mandamientos (forced labor laws) were implemented as plantation
owners and wealthy elites believed Mayans “ha[d] to be made to work, and work hard,” and the
expropriation of land was needed to continue spreading coffee cultivation as the demand for
export increased. “Coffee provided,” as McCreery states, “the motive and the means for
Guatemala state to penetrate the Indigenous community to an unprecedented degree, and it
destroyed much of what remained of values shared between the elite and mass population.” 34
Mayans were essential in making coffee a success, and thus the prosperity of the elites.
McCreery further explains that for Liberal elites, “what Indians thought mattered far less, if it
mattered at all, than that they should be readily and cheaply available for work in the coffee
groves; the growers wanted their bodies not their minds.”35
Another labor-intensive business was established 1901 when, under President Manuel
Estrada Cabrera’s reign (1898 to 1920), Guatemala and the United Fruit Company (UFCO), a
US-based business, signed a pact for banana production. Cabrera granted the UFCO substantial
concessions, which included 110,355 acres of land and an export tax exemption for 35 years for
the construction of the Guatemalan City railway. 36 By 1920, REMHI notes that “the United
States provided 70 percent of Guatemalan imports and controlled 80 percent of its exports
dubbing the company El Pulpo37 (The Octopus).38 Tensions intensified between the Indigenous
population and the landowners following the end of Barrios’s rule and through Cabrera’s time in
33

McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p 117.
McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p119.
35
McCreery, Land, Labor, and Community, p 120.
36
REMHI, Recovery of Historical Memory Project; The official report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of
Guatemala, Guatemala: Never Again! Maryknoll, (London: Orbis Books, 1999), p 182.
37
El Pulpo (The Octopus) was a nickname given because by the late 1920s UFCO had its tentacle in nearly every
economic and political development causing major unrest due to the harsh exploitation of Indigenous and
poor as well as those who suffered expropriation of land for their benefit.
38
REMHI, Guatemala: Never Again! p 182.
34
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office. Historians have thus concluded that Cabrera’s aim was parallel to Barrios’s pursuit in
wealth inequality.39
Rule under Dictator Jorge Ubico Castañeda (1931 to 1944) did not alleviate the pressure
Mayans endured. Like Barrios and Cabrera, Ubicio led an autocratic administration. Although he
did away with debt peonage, he imposed vagrancy laws. In 1934, new vagrancy laws forced men
to work for 100 to 150 days out of the year based on their land holdings.40 Cards were issued for
all men to carry on their persons to prove that they had completed their assigned duties. Men had
to work on state projects, such as constructing roads without machinery, with no pay or
provisions.41 Women were not recruited by the state, yet the state was dependent on them. Amid
having to shift their roles as wives and mothers to be the sole providers for their families while
their husbands were away, Indigenous women were now responsible for making tortillas and
tamales for the workers without pay. As David Carey points out, the most marginalized group
was to “provide the very sustenance that energized the workforce, female food production fueled
Guatemala’s infrastructure development.”42 Resistance of Indigenous women becomes more
evident during this period. This order was an unspoken recognition of what an indispensable role
women played in the success of public work projects.43 Even as they held the status of the most
relegated groups (Maya women), by challenging the state’s order they agitated the state in such a
way that it was obliged to acknowledge them, if not value their compulsory labor. 44
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The October Revolution of 1944, a pro-democracy movement of teachers, students,
military reformers, and emerging middle classes, brought down the 13-year dictatorship of Jorge
Ubico and his brief successor, Fredrico Ponce. 45 Throughout this revolutionary period, also
known as the Ten Years of Spring, democratically elected presidents Juan José Arévalo (19441951) and Jacobo Árbenz (1951-1954) provided a sense of freedom and hope for the Indigenous
and poor ladino population through a series of reforms.46 This period saw an increase in the
number of organizations for workers and entrepreneurs, increased salaries, and well-paid
leadership positions throughout the state. According to anthropologist Jennifer Schirmer, it was
also during this period that the consolidation of political and military powers first began,
impeding on any legislature that encroached in any way on the army’s political territory. 47
Schirmer also points out that the Constitution 1945 transformed the Guatemalan army into a
powerhouse organization allowing them to install a Consejo Superior de Defensa Nacional
(Superior Council of National Defense) which lawfully divided the army and government in turn
consenting to the army’s sovereignty in both its command and mission.48 As quoted in Schirmer,
the Council was a “consulting organization charged with resolving issues related to the
functioning of the army and [that would] act as the Superior Tribunal of the army … to judge and
know matters convocated by the President, Defense Minister or Chief of the Armed Forces.” 49 In
addition, the Constitution noted that dealings pertaining to the “functioning of the army” also
meant protecting “ the rights and freedom of the nation,” “guaranteeing democracy,” and
protecting “ laws and social and political institutions of the country.” 50 Schirmer identifies these
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provisions as “abstract” and “nonelaborated,” “allow[ing] arbitrary and even contradictory
application.”51
However, the reform that created the most change and would consequently end this
period of transformation was the enactment of Árbenz’s Decree 900. Decree 900 was an agrarian
reform law intended to expropriate and redistribute uncultivated land from the largest
landholders while also eliminating forced labor. By 1944 the UFCO was the largest landowner in
Guatemala, with over 180,000 acres of land. Hence, these new agrarian reforms placed US
businessmen at a great disadvantage, as they not only depended heavily on the cheap labor, but
under Arbenz they now were subject to losing large plots of land. For Guatemalan elites, rising
conflict threatened established economic, social, and political interests. As Cindy Forster
mentions, “Challenging the ‘Octopus’ set off a chain reaction among North Americans whose
connections led to the highest halls of power in Washington D.C.” 52 Amidst the Cold War’s
heightened anticommunist sentiment, the United States made preserving hemispheric stability a
high priority. United States government officials viewed these reforms “as Soviet-inspired” that
needed to be eradicated, however the protection of their investments in the UFCO also played a
factor in aiding Guatemala’s elites to remove the “internal enemy.” 53
The revolutionary period came to an end, reversing the agrarian reforms and leaving the
poor “with only a memory of earlier gains.”54 Political agitation, propaganda, and rumors were
tactics used to destabilize and demoralize Arbenz supporters and create discord within his
military, a form of “psychological warfare” taught by the US Central Intelligence Agency
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(CIA).55 Arbenz was forced into exile causing his cadets and young officers to unsuccessfully
attack liberacionistas. Árbenz’s army agreed to surrender in order to avoid punishment. The
state’s “formal ‘countersubversion’ bodies” conducted post-Árbenz purges that resulted in the
detention of 9,000 people and forced into exile another 10,000, while countless civilians were
arrested, tortured, and killed.56 Radio stations were used to broadcast warnings commonly
containing anticommunist rhetoric. This form of intimidation was used to keep any opposition at
bay. Following the Arbenz coup, Greg Grandin points out, the United States “promised that it
would turn Guatemala into a ‘showcase for democracy.’ Instead, it created a laboratory of
repression.”57 The atmosphere in Guatemala no longer resembled that of other nations during this
period, such as Mexico,58 who continued to act on the economic and political requests of their
citizens, in turn creating a strong national allegiance, Guatemala relinquished nothing.59 By the
1960s the motto of the military was “If you’re not part of the solution, you’re part of the
problem,” there were no more negotiations between the state and dissatisfied Mayans. 60
Historian Kirsten Weld notes that a new special unit within the national police titled Special
Investigation Bureau, created by US advisors in 1960, was to be given the authority to
“apprehend anyone suspected of ‘crimes threatening constitutional government,’ in addition a
central records bureau would collect, file, and examine fingerprints, arrest records, photographs,
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personnel description etc. that help track those accused of criminal activity.”61 Though, Weld
states, “what sounded like routine policing—keeping track of lawbreakers—took a sinister cast
when designed primarily to apply to those with ‘political interest contrary to the interests of the
country,” which was returning Guatemala’s status-quo.62 The existing state of affairs put
Guatemala in a position of uncertainty as the wealthy elites depended on obedience of the other
classes (Mayans, poor/middle class ladinos, students, and clergy) in order to maintain the
country’s political and economic stability, thus any contrasting view to that of the states was to
be crushed. In 1967, when these Special Investigation Bureau fused a Master File Registry was
devised for the purpose of providing a more detailed category of searches such as “Communist
Agitators,” “Subversives,” “University Campus,” “Demonstration,” and “Cadavers,” a urban
counterinsurgency approach 63 Once Carlos Castillo Armas took office the shift of powers was
drastically felt throughout the rural communities as, yet again, Mayans and ladino poor were
placed back at the bottom of society as oppression intensified. This turn of events, however, was
what provoked Mayans to begin organizing and resisting the oppressive state’s methods of
control. In turn, the US government increasingly provided the Guatemalan state with military aid
and training to withstand any enemy of the state, simply labelled as “subversives.”64 The Escuela
Politécnica was once again taken under the wing of US officers, as it was during Ubicio’s rule,
training Guatemalan officers in counterinsurgency tactics. 65
The 13 November revolt of 1960 marked the beginning of the guerrilla-state struggle in
Guatemala. This was an uprising of more than 30 percent of army units that was comprised of
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120 left-leaning junior officers attempting to stage a takeover in the fight for constitutional
equality for all and against the meddling of US imperialist (los gringos imperialistas).66 As the
army openly made a way for Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes to take office in 1958, internal strife
among the officers escalated. Though, according to the CEH, divergent interests were expressed
within the Army since 1954. REMHI describes, the Company of Children of Jesus was among
one of the largest groups of military men who debated political and economic conditions in
Guatemala.67 A clandestine group whose officers opposed Ydígoras decision to permit the CIA’s
covert commissioning of Guatemalan officers to train the “antifidelista Brigade 2506 on
Guatemala soil…for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs.”68
The government successfully suppressed the planned coup to take down Ydígoras one
week after rebel forces assembled at Puerto Barrios military base. As a result, 21 percent of all
rebel officers were court marshalled; however, many officers escaped.

69

Lieutenants Luis

Agosto Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, who had recently completed
counterinsurgency training, escaped and in turn formed the guerrilla movements were.70 It would
be Yon Sosa in August of 1961 who would declare the MR-1371 guerrilla movement. Soon after
the joining of Fuerzas Armandas Rebeldes (FAR), the Guatemalan Labor (communist) Party of
the military wing (PGT), and students from the Frente Revolucionarios 12 de abril with MR-13
became the first insurgents who were taken in by poor ladinos who formed ties with Kechi
Indians.72 As mass mobilization gained strength throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the new
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militarized state needed to introduce the United States’ “new repressive technologies to
nationalize violence,” as they lacked the skills and strength to withstand resistance. 73 The state,
largely dominated by the Guatemalan army, became increasingly violent toward “reformist
politicians, the radicalized Catholic Church, Indigenous activist, and a revived labor and present
movement [that] swelled the ranks of [the] left-wing insurgency that, by the end of the decade,
was operating in eighteen of Guatemala's twenty-two departments.”74
In 1965, application of Operacion Limpieza (Operation Cleansing) by US security
advisor John Logan provided training in, as Grandin notes, a “mastermind campaign against
terrorists which would have access to all information from law enforcement agencies.”75 The
ruthless Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque, who was put in charge of this operation, carried out
widespread raids two months into the operation. Grandin notes that in February of 1966 “eight
operations and a number of extrajudicial executions had taken place,” and by early March
Bosque conducted the “largest catch: over thirty leftists captured, interrogated, tortured, and
executed.” Grandin adds, “their bodies placed in sacks and dropped into the Pacific from the
U.S.-supplied helicopters.”76 Campaigns like Operacion Limpieza were a clear indication of the
Guatemalan government’s willingness to use excessive measures in order to subdue those
identified as “internal enemy.”77 Shortly after Bosque’s campaign he carried out the first
scorched-earth operation in March of 1966 as counterinsurgency escalated. 78 The General Policy
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within the CEH documents notes that the counterinsurgent war manual identified two groups as
the internal enemy: “1) Those who challenged the established order by means of illegal actions
and represented ‘revolutionary communists,’” and “2) those who, while not being communists,
still challenged the established order.”79 Going against the unjust system of government was a
necessary action Mayans needed to take as the systematic terror began ravaging their homes and
murdering their families at an increasing rate. Peaceful protest was met with excessive military
violence, therefore, Mayan men and women along with ladino supporters were forced to form
armed revolts against the oppressive Guatemalan state. In compliance with the Doctrine of
National Security, the army “defined the ‘annihilation of the internal enemy’ as a strategic
objective of the counterinsurgency war.”80 By the late 1960s the army had shifted from being a
unit that operated under the state to contain civilians to an entity that assumed control of the
entire state.81
1966 also brought on the emergence of death squads, an operational branch of
intelligence, whose purpose was to infiltrate communities suspected of guerrilla involvement or
support, and spread psychological terror through threats, torturers, and executions. La Mano
Blanca82 (White Hand) was the first death squad to justify its brutal action with the aim of
eradicating communism.83 The CEH analysis of a declassified US document indicated that death
squads were not autonomous structures of the army; more accurately they were “clandestine
structures of Intelligence.”84 Furthermore, CEH testimony explains that these cover up names
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were to protect government structures or state agents from being blamed for the massive human
rights violations that played out. One ex-soldier testified:
Nunca se ha movido la hoja de un roble sin orden del Ejército. La Mano Blanca,
Jaguar Justiciero, Nueva Organización Anticomunista, eran inventos del Ejército.
Tienen muchos nombres ... Todo esto es una construcción de la cúpula militar.
Ellos dan diferentes nombres, como quien dice, son muchas personas civiles que
están apoyando a los militares, pero es mentira. Son los mismos militares que se
hacen pasar por otros grupos para hacer o cometer las fechorías que han hecho en
Guatemala.
Mano Blanca, que es lo mismo que el escuadrón de la muerte. Son ejecutores del
Ejército. Estos pertenecen a la Sección de Inteligencia G-2 y S-2, que es lo
mismo.

The leaf of an oak has never been moved without an order from the Army. The
Mano Blanca, Jaguar Justiciero, New Anti-Communist Organization, were
inventions of the Army.85
They have many names ... This is all a construction of the military dome. They
give different names, as to say, there are many civilians who are supporting the
military, but it is a lie. They are the same soldiers who pose as other groups to do
or commit the misdeeds they have made in Guatemala.86
Mano Blanca, which is the same as the death squad. They are executors of the
Army. These belong to the G-2 and Intelligence Section, which is the same. 87

In 1970, Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio was appointed president by the Institute
Democratic party (PID), a party dominated by the military, that provided the state with a “façade
of democratic politics, marked by periodic elections.”88 Military domination of the government
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during this period allowed counterinsurgency operations to gain hegemonic status of state and
civilian institutions, while bolstering their unrelenting presence throughout the western
highlands.89 By 1978, under President-General Romeo Lucas Garcia, as the organization of rural
communities grew and guerrilla activity swelled, the military repression deepened, which in turn
led to massive bloodshed. Two years prior, following a massive earthquake that killed 20,000
people and left one million homeless of which a majority were Mayan, Indigenous activists had
already been exchanging their views on identity and rights of their people. This new thinking had
created an awakening following the tremor that propelled Maya organizations and churches into
examining the linkage between Indigenous population, poverty, and injustice. The Catholic
Church began earnestly agitating for social justice for the marginalized poor and “pueblo
Indígena.”90 Ricardo Cajas Mejía, one of Konefal’s interviewees from Quetzaltenango, stated
“we didn’t know at the time that the earthquake, a national tragedy, could bring the unification of
so many Indígenas.”91 In essence this tragedy integrated a Maya movement that spread a
heightened awareness of the issues threatening the Indigenous communities.
One of the first significant counterinsurgency attacks on Mayans took place in May 1978
in the community of Panzós, Alta Verapaz when a massive group of Q’eqchi’ campesinos
presented documents to the mayor regarding land that had been taken from them and protested
for their land to be returned. The state fired into a crowd of not just the unarmed Q’eqchi’ men
but women and children that were among the festival goers. Konefal describes chaos as
campesinos attempted to escape into the hills and rivers as they were being chased and gunned
down by army helicopters.92 She goes on to state, “It was a massacre on a scale not yet seen in
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Guatemala’s civil war,” though this type of violence would soon become the new normal form of
combat between the state and Mayans. 93 Indigenous resistance transformed into a more armed
resistance as systemic repression began wiping out Mayans with an unwavering force. Lucas’
regime murdered 35,000 civilians in the highlands and Guatemala City of which a majority were
unarmed. 94 The military demand for new leadership led to his removal by means of a coup
operated by young CEM officers and special forces-trained intelligence officers in March of
1982.95
“I was called to put everything in order,” General Rios Montt stated in 1982 when he took his
place as head of a triumvirate military junta. 96 Montt’s objective was to continue the
counterinsurgency fight with a more methodical and effective approach than former president
Lucas García. Shortly thereafter, Rios Montt would drop the junta and appoint himself president
of Guatemala. His leadership guided the nation into the grimmest, most vicious period of the
civil war. Rios Montt’s aim, as he stated in his weekly televised addresses to the nation, was to
carry out a campaign that would separate insurgents from rural civilians in order to “surgically
excise evil from Guatemala, and ‘dry up the human sea in which the guerrilla fish swim.’” This
would be realized under the Pacification campaign (initially called Operation Ashes, later
dubbed la pacificasión).97 The separation of rural civilians from the “enemy” would not play out
as planned, as these communities were perceived to be guerrilla bases who supported rebel
activity, and for that reason, the land was to be scorched and its inhabitants exterminated. An
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officer interviewed by Schirmer explained how, at the general staff headquarters, there were
drawing boards to distinguish each rural village with a color. For example, the interviewee
describes, “‘red zones’ were in enemy territory: no distinction was made between guerrilleros
and their peasant supporters…The ‘pink zones’ were attacked but left standing, and those ‘white
zones’… ‘safe villages’ to be left alone.”98 The red zones were called matazonas (kill zones).
The military strategy was to disappear entire communities while instilling terror among
surrounding communities.
The senseless acts of violence during the peak of the war (1981-1983) delivered a blow to the
Mayan population. By December of 1982 the heavy hand of Rios Montt’s “Pacification” of the
highlands reconfigured the social, economic, and physical structure of Mayan existence.99 As a
result, the campaign left an estimated 250,000 to 1 million displaced. 100 In 1983, Rios Montt was
removed from office by a coup that brought in Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores (1983- 1986).
Despite this change of leadership, President Mejia continued to carry out the “Pacification”
campaign that further devastated rural Mayan communities.
Gender, Masculinity, and War
Gender-based violence has been used throughout history as a terror tactic of war, a
method to intimidate and control a people. REMHI explains that acts of rape, torture, and bodily
mutilation carried out by government forces were used as ways to “degrade women through their
sexuality, to show the highest contempt for their dignity as a people, and to use the intimate
aspects of womanhood to add measures of exemplary terror.”101 The public spectacles of mass
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rape “reinforced a spirit of machista complicity and extol power and authority as ‘masculine’
traits.”102 Rape and other modes of sexual violence were “weapons of war,” by which
perpetrators, who epitomized dominant masculinity, exercised their power to maintain the
subordination of Indigenous women, and in some cases Indigenous men. Cindy Forster
highlights a testimony given by Estela (pseudonym), a Maya woman who remembered the
violence that Indigenous women and men both faced.
El terror dejó traumada una población entera, también femenizó a todos los
individuos denominados subversivos. Eran vistos como recipientes de todo
mal como la Eva bíblica y sus hijas. Tal es el caso de los capturados, ya que
por toda Latinoamérica los presos políticos inspiraban un profundo odio y
hasta el temor en sus victimarios, que no tiene explicación sin recurrir a lo
simbólico. Los prisioneros masculinos fueron tratados como mujeres y las
mujeres tratadas como putas, ambos torturados en sus partes sexuales y sus
identidades de género. Tanto los hombres como las mujeres sufrieron
repetidas violaciones en las llamadas cárceles clandestinas 103
The terror left an entire population traumatized, and it also feminized all
individuals labeled subversive. They were seen as recipients of all evil, like
Eve and her daughters in the Bible. Such is the case, throughout all of Latin
America, with those captured, because political prisoners inspired a deep
hatred and even fear in their oppressors, who had no explanation [for their
actions] without resorting to symbols. Male prisoners were treated like
women and women were treated like whores, tortured both on their sexual
organs and [with regard to their] gender identities. Men as well as women
suffered repeated rapes in the so-called clandestine jails.
Sexual attacks on men were performed with the intent to emasculate and feminize,
causing them to experience the devaluation, contempt, and humiliation that women suffered.
Though state social structures maintained hierarchical and patriarchal control, and race and
class separated Maya men from ladinos, Indigenous men held a higher rank than women
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within their communities. Acts of rape or sexual torture were meant to eliminate Indigenous
men’s honor while positioning them alongside the ranks of women. These methods of
violence, for men, were largely done for the purpose of extracting knowledge about
insurgents’ whereabouts or to pinpoint allies of rebel forces. Secret houses served as
clandestine prisons operated by the army and used to interrogate and torture men and women
for weeks or even months, which nearly always resulted in death.104 REMHI gathered
testimony that revealed protracted detentions within clandestine prisons, including torture
and interrogations of the worst kind.105 Orders to execute these acts of violence were handed
down by the “highest authorities of the State” who put into effect “institutional policy” that
would “ensur[e] impenetrable impunity.”106
An occurrence in the community of San Andres illustrates the callous nature of the
military as they carried out an attack on innocent villagers for the purpose of discouraging
support for guerrillas in the area. Following the sound of an explosion nearby, military men
entered the village making accusations of guerrilla support. Without warrant or reluctance,
they shot and killed a 60-year-old woman. Shortly thereafter, the campesinos made the
following discovery:
... después descubrieron que en la vecindad habían matado ya a once personas,
previamente torturadas, colocaron estacas en el piso donde sentaron a los hombres
hasta que las mismas les salían por la boca, les cortaron la lengua, las partes nobles y
parte de la cabeza a modo de huacal... - C 361. Enero, 1982. San Andrés Itzapa,
Chimaltenango107
…later they discovered eleven people in the vicinity who had been first tortured then
murdered, they put stakes into the ground and sat the men on them until [the stakes]
came out of their mouths, they cut off their tongues, their noble parts, and part of their
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heads cut open like a huacal…108 -Case 361. January, 1982. San Andrés Itzapa,
Chimaltenango
Grandin tells of a similar case in 1982 in the village of Sechaj,a department of Alta
Verapaz, where a PAC member detained, assaulted, and tortured a PGT109 activist, Fransisco Xi,
before handing him over to a soldier who “amputated his tongue and testicles and put them on
public display,” wounds that led to his eventual death.110 This sent a clear message, “rendering
[him] impotent of voice and virility,” a direct attack of his manhood and a threat to those who
sided with insurgents.111 It was military practice to make examples out of whole villages. There
was no innocent or guilty, all poor Mayas were blameworthy.
Notably, Chimaltenango, north and south Quiché, and northern Huehuetenango
experienced massive destruction as the military followed the trail of the EPG. These villages
were tagged as “red zones” therefore whoever and whatever was in the path of the military upon
arrival “were massacred by being tortured, raped, garroted, killed with machete, hacked or
bashed to death, shot or burned alive.”112
Militarization of the countryside in 1981 became a new ploy to penetrate the social
fabric of Mayan communities while suppressing insurgent alliances through forced
membership in the Patrulla de Autodefensa Civil or PAC (Civil Defense Patrol). Konefal
states PAC members were assigned to Mayan communities to be the eyes and ears of the
military while also forced to “participat[e] in rural terror.”113 Alison Crosby and M. Brinton
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Lykes further elaborate by explaining how PAC members were “expected to betray and
inflict harm on their own community members,…many were tortured and beaten, and some
were forced to witness the rapes of their wives and other women.” 114 Many of the men
expressed “losing their masculine and indigenous authority as community leaders,”
“[evidence] of the intersection of victim and perpetrator indigenous men [experienced]
during war.”115 Villages were ravaged and men were kidnapped and forced into serving the
state as civil PAC or were “disappeared.” A prime example of this can be seen in Crosby and
Lykes’s investigation into the lives of fifteen Mayan women who were taken to the military
outpost of Sepur Zarco in northeastern Guatemala in 1982. An army patrol removed their
husbands from their village over land disputes, leaving women alone and unprotected.
Zarco’s military outpost was one of the “model villages” built for the military, and patrolmen
used it as a place to relax while having all their needs taken care before returning to their
duties. Twelve out of the fifteen women interviewed said they were ordered to “serve” at
Sepur Zarco’s outpost.116 As reported by Konefal, “by the end of 1983 1.3 million Maya men
took part in patrol [PAC] nearly 17 percent of Guatemala’s population,” and women were
made into sexual and domestic slaves at these “special” outpost from 1982 to 1986.117
These attacks began strategically targeting women, elders, and children during raids.
Kaibiles would often dress as guerrillas and infiltrate communities asking for food, and when it
was delivered the communities would be accused of being guerrilla supporters. Dos Erres was a
remote village in Petén that experienced the army’s blatant disregard for Mayan life in December
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of 1982 when they had been accused by another community of being guerrilla sympathizers and
the ones who fostered the rebels who had previously ambushed and killed 21 soldiers and
stealing 19 of their rifles.118 Kaibiles invaded the Dos Erres village massacring all. The women
and children were taken to the church while the men were locked away in the schools. The
Kaibiles search for their rifles and guerrilla propaganda, but their search was unsuccessful.
Nonetheless, their orders to “vaccinate” 119 the Mayans were carried out. According to CEH, all
children were killed with a sledgehammer to the head and tossed into a dry well, while babies
were grabbed by their feet and swung against trees or walls before also being tossed in.
Testimony given to the CEH stated that some specialists began to rape underage girls, resulting
in the death of many.120 Men, women, and elders were all pushed into the well one by one, and
when no more could fit, many still alive screaming for help and trying to claw their way out, the
patrol ravaged them with bullets. The killing, rape, and torture went on for days; one former
Kaibil testified to the CEH that soldiers would go back and repeatedly rape the women even as
they fought to resist their abuses. 121 The CEH located in the court records the testimony of a
direct witness that also expressed the ferocious nature of the Kaibiles detailing how they would
cause pregnant women to have abortions by beating their stomachs incessantly, he states,“[y]ou
could see how they beat them in the belly with weapons, or put them to bed and the soldiers
jumped at them over and over again until the boy was bummed out.”122 The CEH concluded that
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350 inhabitants were annihilated, resulting in the total extermination of the Dos Erres
community.
Many Indigenous men, like PAC members, were traumatized from carrying out attacks
on their own people. However, Konefal notes that their compliance was a form of selfdefense. Schirmer further explains how PAC members feared that if they did not obey
military orders, their families would be punished and their villages would be sacked.
PACs were made up of thousands of civilians forcibly conscripted into platoons, rarely
trained, and typically only equipped with machetes and clubs, as they patrolled villages,
attacked guerrillas, and played the role of secret informers to the army.123
Victor Montejo, a ladino schoolteacher in the remote pueblo of Tzalalá, gave a telling
testimony of his experience with the collision between the army and a PAC. Both the
army and the civil patrol mistakenly thought the other was a guerrilla force on attack.
Montejo was subjected to extreme scrutiny by armed forces and taken back to the city
barracks for further interrogation. Fearful of what his fate might be, he sat silently forced
to listened to the howls of a man being tortured until sounds grew faint. In a moment of
reflection, he could not grasp just how these soldiers could so callously carry out such
orders. “Why was it…that the soldiers harbor so much hatred in their hearts and behave
so drastically towards their own people?” Montejo questioned.124 Montejo recalled a
conversation he had with an old friend, an ex-soldier, and he explained to him how
soldiers performed:
“[T]hey brainwash and indoctrinated them in such a way that [they] could
torture [their] own parents, if they were ordered to,” he continues, “I spent
three years in the barracks, and what did I learn? Fucking zero! The only
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thing they taught is to kill and kill, again and again...you soon want to start
making bullets fly, as if to say, it makes you feel real macho and no one can
stand in your way.”125
Impunity had always played a role in the power that government-trained
counterinsurgents exerted during the intrusion and extermination of Mayan communities.
Elizabeth Oglesby points out that in sociologist Matilde González Izás’ analysis of oral history
collected in a province of El Quiché “shows how local authority figures such as military
commissioners and civil-patrol commanders were granted arbitrary power over life and death,”
she explains, “[p]art of the way this power was exercised was through the conquest of women’s
bodies.”126 The army and PAC commanders used rape as a way disparage their womanhood by
breaking them down physically and mentally, and to keep them from one day speaking about
what they had done.127
War and Violence against Women and Children
Research has shown that the sexual and psychological abuse of Maya women has
been constant throughout Guatemala’s history. Cindy Forster explains in her work that men
used rape as a way to “enforce domination and maintain submission.” 128 Between 1936 and
1956, the majority of rape claims went undocumented and unpunished, essentially permitting
offenders to abuse again. 129 Male privilege, regardless of class or race, made it difficult for
women to bring criminal charges against their abusers. Nonetheless, Mayan women found
ways to resist the ethnic and national patriarchal structures imposed on them. According to
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Forster, “rape b[ore] accurate witness to the limitations Guatemalan society placed upon
women and the points at which it denied women the rights and personal dignity considered
the birthright of males.”130
From 1962-1996, rape was an extensive counterinsurgency policy and systematic
practice in which 99 percent of the victims were women, an estimated 89 percent of whom
were Mayan women.131 A majority of these rapes happened during the heightened conflict of
the early 1980s. Found in Rigoberta Menchú’s testimony is a detailed description of the
kidnapping, extensive torture, and murder of her mother, Juana Tum. Menchú uses her story
as an example of the countless inhumane acts of violence that not just her mother endured but
all Mayan women during this period. In 1979, Menchú’s family had dispersed into different
villages because they were being hunted by the government, for being “communist” and a
“bad influence” that needed to be “weed[ed] out.”132 In the end nearly all of Menchú’s family
had been killed at the hands of the state. As agonizing and traumatic as it was for Menchú to
experience so much loss, each tragedy regenerated in her the urgency to not just mobilize but
to make the other Mayans aware of the importance of their participation in the fight against
the state. Though Anthropologist David Stoll believed, through his analysis of Menchú’s
account, that her mother’s rape and killing was dramatized and questioned Menchú’s
authenticity, the reality was that her mother was among 89 percent of Mayan women who
were raped and often killed. Rape constituted a systematic practice that reached an
unprecedented level of barbarity during the 1980s. Her oral account was not just a narrative
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of her lived experiences but one of Mayans collectively. Menchú, in her testimony, I,
Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, opens by stating;
I’d like to stress that it’s not only my life, it’s also the testimony of my
people…The important thing is that what has happened to me has happened to
many other people too: my story is the story of all poor Guatemalans. My
personal experience is the reality of a whole people.133
In his book, Who Is Rigoberta Menchú?, Grandin notes the important political role Menchú’s
book played; “the political success of the book, its unexpectedly wild popularity in Europe and
the US, actually strengthened the non-militarist wing of the insurgents, which was able to use the
attention of the book focused on Guatemala to create a political space that allowed for negotiated
end to the countries prolonged civil war.”134 Despite any omissions or exaggerations in
Menchú’s narrative, REMHI confirms that “torture sessions frequently were held in public, in
front of relatives and neighbors, as a form of exemplary terror. Many torture victims were
subsequently killed.”135 Scenes like what Menchú described was common throughout armed
conflict, it was a part of the state’s “methodology of horror.”
The systemic assaults of the 1980s were unleashed on Mayan communities where
deliberate attacks on Indigenous women became a common practice. The senseless acts of
violence during the peak of the war (1981-1983) delivered a blow to the Mayan population. By
December of 1982 the heavy hand of Rios Montt’s military “Pacification” of the highlands
reconfigured the social, economic, and physical organization of Mayan existence in the.136 The
campaign left an estimated 250,000 to 1 million displaced in the highlands. 137 In 1983, Rios
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Montt was removed from office by a coup that brought in Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores
(1983-1986) a Guatemalan Christian Democracy.
REMHI gathered accounts from witnesses of sexual assaults, “a form of violence against
women that was employed in a variety of situations during abductions and detentions, massacres,
military operations, and so on."138 REMHI concluded that one of every six massacre cases they
investigated, “the rape of women was part of soldiers and civil patrols’ modus operandi…female
bodies were just seen as just one more possession.”139 Raping of Maya women represented a
continued systematic denial of female rights. In many cases women were raped by multiple men
and left crippled from how savagely they were handled, and their children made to bear witness.
Alison Crosby, who interviewed 54 Maya women from different zones of Guatemala, reveals
that each one was subjected to rape, some multiple times, in front of their children “or when they
themselves were still children and their mothers were forced to watch.”140 Forced separations left
women to suffer psychological and physical traumas. The CEH collected evidence regarding exmilitary men, who served in areas of heightened conflict during the war, explaining what they
would do with the children whose lives they spared. The following testimony was of an exmilitary man describing the scene after an encounter with guerrilla forces that left civilians dead
and their children now orphaned.
“quedan niños vivos, ¿qué se hace con un niño de esos?, ¿qué haría usted? ¡Recogerlo!
… el Ejército sí los jaló”141
“A los dos niños los llevaron al pueblo y los regalaron a la gente …
cuando capturaban a niños y no los mataban de una vez, así hacían
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con ellos, regalarlos a la gente en los pueblos.”142 C 3559. Octubre, 1983. San Juan
Cotzal, Quiche
“children are left alive, what do you do with one of those children? What would you do?
Take him! … The Army indeed took them all.”
“They took the two children to town and gave them to the people ...
when they captured children and didn't kill them all at once, that's
what they did with them, give them away to the people in the
villages.” C 3559. October, 1983. San Juan Cotzal, Quiche
Death squads like Kaibiles, were especially brutal to women and children as their
objective was to eliminate every source of life.143 One instance in the village Barilla,
Huehuetenago an eight-month pregnant woman was cut open, her unborn child removed and
subsequently tossed around.144 It was their way of destroying the seed that would cultivate more
of, as the military saw it, the enemy. As Etelle Higonnet explains her analysis of the genocide
portion of the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) report in Quiet Genocide, “women
were not simply [considered] biological reproducers, but transmitters of a cultural values to a
new generation. If the women are affected, then the community as a whole is deeply shaken.”145
Rachel Nolan’s research on adoption in Guatemala during the war shows that the Guatemalan
state set out to “terminate the seed of future guerrilla fighters” through kidnapping and
disappearing children. 146 The state took advantage of parents in rural communities in which
mothers were lied to, tricked, intimidated, or threatened with violence so they would surrender
their children to social workers. Violence against mothers was, in effect, violence against their
children given that their survival was dependent on them. Nolan points out that a “majority of
disappeared children were indigenous, which coincided with the first objective [of the state]. The
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result of removing Indigenous children from their families was to ‘create general terror’ and to
‘make a profit from the sale of children,’” and again to “stamp out a ‘bad seed’ through the
appropriation of children.”147 Mayan children were seen “as racially mutable through placement
with families in Guatemala and abroad,” essentially “children, unlike adults, could be redeemed
if they were replanted in the right soil with proper couples” who were non-Communist.148
Operations were ordered by the government through the efforts of social workers to cleanse the
Guatemalan race by killing or destroying the women who progenerate the future of Mayans and
extract children who were young enough to mold. Campaigns like these were a more direct part
of genocide—a way to permanently remove Indian culture.
Agency
“It wasn’t that it couldn’t be done, it was that we dared to do it.” - Stated by a Mayan
woman in an interview documented in REMHI 149
In the face of incessant violence, Mayan women found ways of resisting the triple yoke
of oppression imposed by the state. Class and race were intertwined with gender oppression that
resulted in women not only being demoralized for being women, but for existing as poor Mayan
women. Indigenous women were born into a culture and a nation deeply rooted in a patriarchal
power system that bolstered male authority and preserved women’s subordinate position. As
historian David Carey points out, Indigenous women “were neither autonomous nor powerless;
they made history, but not under the circumstances of their choosing.” 150 The intensity in which
the state had begun moving through rural Guatemala massacring villages, raping women,
torturing, and disappearing hundreds of innocent people, women began realizing they could not
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solely depend on the men within their communities to organize and fight, but they too needed to
participate in their struggle. It was necessary for women to prevail over their pain and the deaths
they had witnessed. As Menchú shares in her testimony, the sorrow she felt after losing her
brother and parents was difficult to bear, but that grief was not only hers to carry, it was also the
grief of all Mayans who had experienced loss or were subjected to violence. In a conversation
with her little sister, she recalled her saying that the death of their parents (and all compañeros)
was the reason for their fight, her sister asserts, “we must be like revolutionary women [and] a
revolutionary isn’t born out of something good, he is born out of wretchedness and bitterness,”
she continues, but “[their loss] gives us one more reason…to fight without measuring our
suffering, or what we experience, or thinking about the monstrous things we must bear in life.” 151
The state’s attempt to intimidate, drive away or wipe away a people had failed. By the
1980s, nearly a quarter of combatientes were women who left their children to go to the
mountains (a subirse a la montaña) in order to train with the guerrillas. Menchú expresses the
role women played in the war was extraordinary from fighting, secretly transposing documents,
constructing barricades, or planting propaganda bombs and it was not for power but rather, as
Menchú states, “so that something will be left for human beings. And this gives us the courage to
be steadfast in the struggle, in spite of the danger.”152
At the core of Indigenous cultural identity stood Mayan women as invaluable bearers of
future generations as well as the pillars that sustained unity in the midst of conflict. REMHI’s
documents corroborate the importance of women in the success of society stating, “women were
the ones to repair broken social ties, preserving family cohesion even under the most adverse
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conditions. They were the ones who preserved the essential ingredients for reestablishing life
among groups of survivors.”153 For this reason, the extermination campaigns of women and
children were a central component in the quest to destroy Indigenous identity. The state
understood that without women, Mayans cease to exist, a strategy they imposed to obliterate a
race. However, the state’s ploy to fracture Indigenous participation in the war was an effort
rendered unsuccessful. As Menchú explains, “[b]efore everyone used to think that a leader had to
be someone who knew how to read, write and prepare documents…saying ‘I am a leader, it’s my
job to lead and yours to fight,’” but that was not the order of things within their organizations. 154
What Indigenous people knew was enough, because along the way they learned from others what
was necessary to fight against the state. Menchú’s mother expressed to her that women “too had
to participate, so that when the repression comes and with it a lot of suffering, it’s not only men
who suffer. Women must join the struggle [but] in their own way.”155 Forster reveals that women
who worked in recruiting civilian women had to assure them it was in the best interest of their
people to rise up against the tyranny of the state. Like in ex-combatant Adela’s testimony to
Forster, in which she explained how guerrillas from the very beginning had an important task to
perform, they all had to become organizers who from time to time would make their way to the
coastal areas giving political talks in an attempt to convince Mayans the importance in unifying
for the betterment of their families and all Mayans.156 Another ex-combatant’s testimony,
(pseudonym Patricia) was taken during the last phase of the war, which demonstrated how
women had been persistent throughout the decades of kidnappings, massacres and torturing of
their people. Patricia states:
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Bajábamos así en las fincas. …Juntábamos a la gente. Algunos tenían miedo y los
finqueros no lo gustaban. Vigilábamos también. Hay gente que sí apoyaba, y preguntaba.
Primero ellos tenían miedo si uno es igual a los soldados. Nosotros aclaramos que no
hacíamos daño a nadie. Hay señores que apoyaron. Iban a avisar así a donde estaban los
soldados. Los finqueros tenían miedo, porque ellos no pagaban bien a los trabajadores,
los discriminaron. También hablamos con los dueños. Ahora tiene que unirse, decíamos a
los trabajadores, organizarse, porque si no se organice, no va a hacer nada. Los
trabajadores tienen miedo porque si se organicen para formar su sindicato o para que
respeten sus derechos, les corren. Yo digo que sólo con organizándose hay solución.
Tiene que proponer propuestas y hacer manifestaciones para reclamar sus derechos. Si no
hay unidad, no se puede lograr algo.
We used to go down to the farms. … We brought people together. Some were afraid and
the farmers did not like it. We kept watch too. There are people who did support, and
asked. First they were afraid if one is equal to the soldiers. We clarified that we did not
harm anyone. There are gentlemen who supported. They were going to tell where the
soldiers were. The farmers were afraid, because they did not pay the workers well, they
discriminated against them. We also spoke with the owners. Now is the time you all need
to unite, we said to the workers, organize, because if you do not organize, nothing will
change. The workers are afraid because if they organize to form their union or to respect
their rights, they will be fired. I would say that there is solution through organizing. You
have to propose proposals and make demonstrations to claim your rights. If there is no
unity, nothing can be achieved.
Many Indigenous women sacrificed a great deal by taking up arms and fighting alongside
their compañeros. Forster documents an interview with Yolanda Colóm an Indigenous woman
who describes their position among men stating, “It was a tradition that women were almost
always collaborators. A kind of rearguard for parents, siblings, boyfriends, husbands,
children.”157 In the mountain where the guerrillas trained gender did not matter. Forster points
out how Elena’s testimony shows that women were treated as equals. Elena continues to
elaborate about her position and respect given to women fighters:
Tenía mi grado como teniente. Yo tengo que dar orden a ellos, algunas 30
personas. A mí me emocionó mucho porque no todos tienen grado. A mí, sí, subí
rápido, me alegré mucho. ¿Y por qué? [Los dirigentes] me dijeron que es por mi
esfuerzo… [A su juicio como oficial], …la capacidad que tenemos es todo igual
con el hombre. No hay uno menos ni más, todo igual. Por ejemplo en la comida,
157
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todos tuvimos igual. La única diferencia es que tiene más fuerza el hombre, pero
cargamos igual, trabajamos igual, combatimos igual. Por la misma política los
hombres tienen que tratarnos bien, cambiar su mentalidad.158
I had the rank of lieutenant. I have to give orders to them, some 30 people. I was
very moved because not everyone has a rank. To me, yes, I went up fast, I was
very happy. And why? [The leaders] told me that it is because of my effort ... [In
his opinion as an officer], ... the capacity we have is all the same with men. There
is no one less or more, everything the same. For example with food, we all had
the same. The only difference is that men are stronger, but we carry the same
load, we work the same, we fight the same. By the same policy, men have to treat
us well, change their mentality.
This interviewee expressed the idea that men valued women equally. Elena goes further as to
describe men taking on roles that were traditionally reserved for women. She explains, “the men
learned how to wash their clothes, how to cook, how to do everything. Sweep, mop, change
diapers. Everything changed.”159 Forester notes that even with all the hardships they encountered
in the mountains, it was the one place poor women found their self-worth in brotherhood with
men.”160
The civil war worsened the status of women in Guatemala to the point where they took
matters into their own hands. They had reached a stage in which approval or permission by
males was something of the past. Mayan women took hold of their agency by not only taking up
arms in the mountains, but they investigated, demonstrated, and organized against the
accumulating human rights violations. Groups, spearheaded by women, like Mutual Support
Group161 (GAM), served to locate the thousands of disappeared. According to REMHI, it was the
“Mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters of the disappeared…who dared to defy the [military’s]

Forster, “Me Di Cuenta,” p 27.
“…y los hombres aprendieron como lavar su ropa, como cocinar, como hacer todo. Barrer, trapear, cambiar
pañales. Todo se cambió…” Forester, “Me Di Cuenta,” p 27.
160
Forster, “Me Di Cuenta,” p 27.
161
Mutual Support Group or GAM was established in 1984 during President Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores time
in office.
158
159

Phillips 45
raging violence. Never before had they been considered protagonists in the political life of the
country, yet they displayed courage, resolve, and hope on countless occasions.” 162 GAM became
the nucleus of many other social movements that protested and demonstrated against the
injustices of the state. Women took on a trailblazing role of activism contributing to the greater
social awareness of their demands. In an interviewed obtained by REMHI the tenacity and
strength of women in the face of military forces is illustrated as followed:
When we women began to call for our disappeared relatives, for life, for freedom
from military dictatorship that totally dominated the country, then women's
activism began to be more apparent. Even the army was surprised. It was
unbelievable that these little women, these little girls, frail as they are, faced up to
an army that has always been feared, do you understand me? That's when I think
they began to realize that the participation of women is effective, that women are
courageous. Because no one could believe that we women could face, harass, and
chase away the army. At least that's how it was, it literally was like that: women
chased the army away. It wasn't that it couldn't be done it was that we dared to do
it.163
The emergence of the Association of Families of the Disappeared and Detained of Guatemala
(FAMDEGUA) in 1992 took their movement further by pushing for the investigations of
massacres, accompaniment during exhumation, and demands for restitution. 164 It was the
pressure from FAMDEGUA that allowed for the exhumation of the Dos Erres village that was
massacred in December of 1982.165 From 1994 to 1995 162 remains were rescued allowing these
individuals’ lives to be acknowledged and allowing families to properly bury their loved ones
with dignity and honor.
These indigenous organizations emerged to take back their communities, repress military
control, and to put pressure on the state to acknowledge the human rights violations committed.
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The leadership roles that women took within these organizations in fighting and vocalizing their
plight was instrumental in bringing international awareness to the gruesome conditions within
Guatemala and their struggle against impunity. Leaders like Rigoberta Menchú, Helen Mack,166
and Rosalina Tuyuc,167 just to name a few, are attributed to using their voice on behalf of
Mayans in search of social justice while remaining steadfast in their cause. Among these women
were many more who throughout the civil war who demonstrated an enormous capacity to avoid
becoming discouraged, to pull themselves together, and undertake new strategies for the survival
and success of all Mayans.
Conclusion
“We are avengers of death. Our race will never be extinguished while there is light in the
morning star.” -written in Popol Vuh (Council book) by anonymous K’iche scribes in the mid1500s.168
Peace talks had been proposed by the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)
as early as 1986 but were denied by President Vinicio Cerezo. The UNRG had propositioned the
removal and restructuring of security forces, however, Cerezo made clear there would be no
dialog unless the URNG agreed to government amnesty.169 Since no agreement was made, the
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government-sponsored policy of repression continued and intensified. A number of intimidation
ploys against grassroot organizations were carried out in an attempt to deter the spread of
international attention. Again in 1988, the URNG petitioned for a cessation of hostilities and yet
once more their request for dialogue had been dismissed. It would take ten years before peace
discussions would close, and armed confrontation between the Guatemalan Government and the
left-wing guerrillas would end. In the early 1990s, the United Nations, with support from the
international community, began mediating the long formal process of peace negotiation between
the government and UNRG.170 These negotiations ultimately led to the signing of the Peace
Accords on December 29, 1996 under President Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen that would halt the
violence that had been ongoing for 36 years. Yet, as Jennifer Schirmer described, the signing of
the Accords would not be the final obstacle, but rather the enactment and fulfilment of the Peace
Accords presented the most challenges.171 Schirmer states in concluding her analysis of the
military, “[the military’s] repressive habits of mind, and hegemonic power within at State of their
own crafting will continue to haunt Guatemala into the twenty-first century, managing a violence
that is a democracy only in name.”172 Interviews of former officers corroborated her closing
analysis of the military’s mindset explaining their concern regarding the adverse factors of
integrating Mayans into Guatemala’s political life. For example a lieutenant colonel in the
Defense Ministry spoke of the advancement of the Pan-Maya organization stating, “for the next
five to six years will only be run by Mayan intellectuals and academics, but in the medium term
of twenty to twenty-five years, if it succeeds in homogenizing the differences within the Mayan
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community and creates conditions for leadership, could become a political movement that forms
the basis of a new political party in the twenty-first century.”173 Preventing former guerrilla
members infiltration of the state’s political realm continued to form parts of the military’s new
arsenal of subjugation into the twenty-first century.174
Guatemala continued to experience conflict well beyond the 1996 Accords agreement.
The agreement put forth a national reconciliation law for the disarmament of the guerrillas,
however, this law reflected the interest of military amnesty. Military amnesty would allow for
those who committed crimes during the war to be absolved from any future persecution.175 In
addition, the concept of “reconciliation” was broadly addressed in this agreement through
mentions of national unity, harmony, and solidarity, as the people still in power (elites of
Guatemala) were not prepared for the extensive social, political, an institutional transformation
necessary to achieve true reconciliation.176 What reconciliation meant to those power brokers
was starting over without seeking revenge, in essence discounting the 36 years of bloodshed,
tortures, rapes, kidnappings, and femicide that were largely experienced by Mayans. Yet, the
trauma endured during the civil war demanded a deeper acknowledgment of what had transpired
as well as extensive work in rebuilding the social fabric that was dismantled within their Mayan
communities. Moving forward was especially difficult for women, particularly rural Maya
women, who became targeted victims of a war that was not only about race and class but gender
as well. Women continued to experience violence and poverty as many were ostracized from
their communities for being the victims of military rape. The truth-telling process that was
incorporated into the Peace Accords was intended to unveil, through the thousands of testimonies

173

Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project, p 273.
Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project, p 273.
175
Helen Mack, “What is Reconciliation?,” trans. Elizabeth Oglesby in The Guatemala Reader p 450.
176
Mack, “What is Reconciliation?,” trans. Elizabeth Oglesby in The Guatemala Reader, p 450.
174

Phillips 49
collected, the egregious human rights violations Mayans faced. Additionally, this process was
created to help victims, turned protagonist, seek justice for all Mayans and heal from the
dramatic consequences of their racialized gendered experiences.177
The gross violations of human rights in genocidal proportions was concluded by the
Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC). Both TRC reports, the Recovery of Historical
Memory Project (REMHI) Guatemala: Never Again (1998) and the Commission for Historical
Clarification (CEH) A Memory of Silence (1999), authenticated the constructional and systematic
nature of armed conflict. The CEH documented that 626 massacres were committed
predominantly by the army, and reinforced by special groups like the Kaibiles.178 Attacks on
Mayan communities were responsible for the displacement of anywhere between 500,000 and
1.5 million people in Guatemala or beyond its borders.179 In the end the Guatemalan Civil War
left more than 200,000 people dead of which 83 percent were Mayan. A deliberate attack on a
race of people who had, since the states independence, only searched for equality from the
minority of elite ladino population.
The CEH states in it’s opening paragraph states,
Guatemala is a country of contrasts and contradictions…[filled with pages that
have been] written of shame and infamy, disgrace and terror, pain and grief, all as
a product of the armed confrontation among brothers and sisters. For more than 34
years, Guatemalans lived under the shadow of fear, death and disappearance as
daily threats in the lives of ordinary citizens.180
Yet, Mayans unified and fought to reestablish a country that once reflected a thriving
“multiethnic, pluricultural and multilingual nation, in a State which emerged from the triumph of
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liberal forces in Central America,” that had made strides towards equal distribution of wealth and
rights.181 However, the fighting has not ceased as Mayan women and men continue to push the
barriers that still restrict their freedoms in a predominately elite patriarchal society.
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